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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates bias in coverage between Western and
Arab media on Twitter after the November 2015 Beirut and
Paris terror attacks. Using two Twitter datasets covering each
attack, we investigate how Western and Arab media differed
in coverage bias, sympathy bias, and resulting information
propagation. We crowdsourced sympathy and sentiment la-
bels for 2,390 tweets across four languages (English, Arabic,
French, German), built a regression model to characterize
sympathy, and thereafter trained a deep convolutional neural
network to predict sympathy. Key findings show: (a) both
events were disproportionately covered (b) Western media ex-
hibited less sympathy, where each media coverage was more
sympathetic towards the country affected in their respective
region (c) Sympathy predictions supported ground truth analy-
sis that Western media was less sympathetic than Arab media
(d) Sympathetic tweets do not spread any further. We discuss
our results in light of global news flow, Twitter affordances,
and public perception impact.
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INTRODUCTION
On 12 November, 2015, the city of Beirut (Lebanon) wit-
nessed two bombings1 at approximately 18:00 Eastern Euro-
pean Time (EET) (UTC+02:00), coordinated by two suicide
bombers that detonated explosives in Bourj el-Barajneh, a
southern suburb of Beirut. This suburb is largely inhabited by
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Beirut_bombings; last retrieved:
24.12.2017
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Shia Muslims, and reports estimate the number of deaths to
be anywhere between 37 to 43, with over 200 injured. These
bombings constituted the worst attack in Beirut since the end
of the 1990 Lebanese Civil War. Shortly after the attacks, the
Islamic State (IS)2 claimed responsibility for the attacks.
A day later, on 13 November, 2015 beginning at 21:20 Central
European Time (CET) / UTC+01:00, three suicide bombers
carried out a series of coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris3 on
its northern suburb, Saint-Denis. They struck near the Stade
de France in Saint-Denis, followed by suicide bombings and
mass shootings at cafés, restaurants and a music venue in
central Paris. The attacks resulted in the deaths of 130 people,
and injury of 368 people. These attacks were purported to be
the deadliest on France since World War II. Shortly after the
attacks, IS also claimed responsibility for the attacks.
The days after the November attacks in Paris, people took so-
cial media by storm in response to the events. From outcries of
sympathy and solidarity with Paris, to outcries against or sup-
port for Islam [38], to proclamations that mainstream coverage
of the Beirut attacks have been sparse and uncaring. In such
press reports, we find allegations suggesting reports about at-
tacks, bombings and other crisis events that Western media do
not sympathize with attacks in the Arab world as much as they
do for attacks in the Western world. Even though many studies
have already shown that news providers are inherently biased
(such as in what to cover) [3, 25] where attention asymmetries
exist [1], the question arises why differential coverage across
crisis events may occur in social media content.
According to Kwak and An [32], how a piece of news is re-
ported (specifically how sympathetic it is to those affected)
has the capacity to evoke compassion, which can facilitate
monetary support and launch collective public action. This
has far reaching implications given the media’s power (even
on microblog platforms like Twitter) in shaping public dis-
course and perception of global events [48], which raises the
following questions: To what extent cultural, religious, or
geo-political factors account for news media bias in coverage
of global terror attacks? And what makes a country news-
worthy of sympathy under such events? We believe this has
2In Arabic also known as Da’ish.
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_2015_Paris_attacks; last
retrieved: 24.12.2017
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implications for how news organizations can better manage
public opinion using social media sites during the immediate
and long-term aftermath of a political and/or religious crisis
event (e.g., terror attack). Importantly, exposure to biases has
been shown to have the capability to foster intolerance and
create ideological segregation in major political and social is-
sues [19], and this may be amplified across Western and Arab
cultures. Considering the time-critical nature of Twitter news
reporting, it becomes key to develop approaches for under-
standing sympathy, and as we show later, our work contributes
a first step towards such an approach for viewing Twitter as a
journalism tool that can help in detecting sympathy.
During November 2015, examples of online news headlines
included: “Beirut, Also the Site of Deadly Attacks, Feels For-
gotten"4 by The New York Times, “Paris, Beirut, and the
Language Used to Describe Terrorism"5 by The Atlantic, or
“Did the media ignore the Beirut bombings? Or did readers?"6
by Vox. While coverage of the attacks may have been dispro-
portionate, discussion as to why this was so was polarized. On
one end, public and journalistic response attributed blame to-
wards the media and its volume and style of coverage (cf., The
Atlantic), and on the other end (cf., Vox) there were claims
that the media did its part in adequate news reporting, but
since Western readers did not care, coverage was drastically
reduced. Given such statements, this paper tries to quantify the
differences across this observed differential news coverage.
We believe these events provide an interesting use-case to
study, because: (a) it allows us to examine in detail whether
Western and Arab media exhibit differences in reporting global
crisis events, and if so, how such differences manifest (b) the
unique context of our study, marked by the rare successive oc-
currences of two crisis events at places within the Western and
Arab world, allows exploring the relative differences specific
to those two worlds (c) it allows us to examine such biases us-
ing publicly available social media data (in our case, Twitter),
and in turn how this can aid journalistic social media practice
in ensuring transparency and quality in produced content.
In this paper, we adopt research on media bias to study news
on Twitter (cf., [20, 59]). Our focus here is not on whether
media biases exist within Twitter as a social media platform
specifically, but rather we use Twitter as a journalism tool to
study time-critical news reporting and provide first steps to
develop an approach for classifying sympathetic tweets. Here,
the affordances of Twitter as a platform can be redesigned
to aid news reporters by automatically detecting (sympathy)
biases. Twitter data was deemed suitable because: (a) Twitter
has become a popular channel for news reporting by main-
stream media [30, 42] (b) the large quantity of tweets allows
us to gain insight into the temporal aspect of news coverage at
a finer grained level than with news articles (c) the uncensored
nature of tweets that are collected with the Twitter Streaming
4http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/world/middleeast/beirut-
lebanon-attacks-paris.html; last retrieved: 24.12.2017
5http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/paris-
beirut-media-coverage/416457/; last retrieved: 24.12.2017
6http://www.vox.com/2015/11/16/9744640/paris-beirut-media; last
retrieved: 24.12.2017
API (d) the costs involved in labeling tweets for sympathy are
lower than lengthier pieces of news coverage.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS & CONTRIBUTIONS
Given the foregoing motivation, we aim to better understand
media coverage differences on Twitter through computation-
ally capturing news sympathy during such unexpected, human-
induced crisis events. Bias can be viewed as a partial perspec-
tive on facts [53], which can be further broken down into three
aspects [9]: selection bias (gatekeeping), or which stories are
selected; coverage bias, or how much attention is given to a
story; and statement bias, or how a story is reported. Here, we
used these concepts and zoomed in on the Beirut and Paris
attacks, to examine in detail whether their coverage on Twitter
differed. Here, we focus on coverage bias, statement bias
(specifically on characterizing news sympathy), and whether
sympathetic messages propagate further on Twitter. Since we
are only concerned with the differences in reporting of these
two events, we do not consider selection bias. The underlying
assumption we make here is that it is important to minimize
such bias, even if only on social networks like Twitter. We
posit the following questions:
• RQ1 - Coverage bias: Was there a difference (in terms
of normalized tweet volume) between Western and Arab
media coverage of the Beirut and Paris attacks?
• RQ2 - News media sympathy bias: Was there a difference
between Western and Arab media in how sympathetic the
tweets were towards affected individuals across each event?
• RQ3 - Information propagation: Do sympathetic and pos-
itive sentiment tweets propagate further throughout the Twit-
ter network (i.e., receive more retweets)?
For coverage bias, we hypothesized that the Beirut attacks
would receive less coverage from Western media, but not from
Arab news media accounts on Twitter, with the inverse for
coverage of Paris. This is in line with the news flow theory
[51], which states that the prominence of a foreign country
in the news is attributed to three groups of variables: (a) na-
tional traits (e.g. size and power of the foreign country), (b)
relatedness (e.g., proximity to a foreign country in terms of ge-
ography, demography, etc.) and (c) events (e.g., wars, disasters,
protests) [51, 60]. In this case, Paris is both geographically and
culturally closer to Western countries, and given the timeline
of both attacks, Paris would likely attract more coverage.
Given news statements (e.g., NYTimes’s article7) on differen-
tial coverage and Diakopoulos’s [14] work on Twitter news-
worthiness, we expected that tweets from Western media cov-
ering the Beirut attacks would overall exhibit less sympathy
than coverage of the Paris attacks, while the inverse is true for
Arab Twitter news media, which would exhibit more sympathy
towards the Beirut attacks. In this paper, our objective is to ex-
plore these questions using a combination of NLP techniques
and crowdsourcing on Twitter datasets. Finally, we look at
information diffusion [56], where previous research has found
that negative news sentiment on Twitter enhances virality [24],
7http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/world/middleeast/beirut-
lebanon-attacks-paris.html; last retrieved: 24.12.2017
CHI 2018 Paper CHI 2018, April 21–26, 2018, Montréal, QC, Canada
Paper 556 Page 2
while other work found that emotionality and positivity in
online news content increases virality [4]. Despite mixed find-
ings, we expected that tweets which are sympathetic (as well
as ones with positive sentiment) to be more likely to spread
throughout the Twitter network, by resulting in more retweets.
In this paper, we make the following contributions to human-
computer interacton and social computing research:
1. We provide a deeper, data-driven understanding of how the
Western and Arab news coverage of the Paris and Beirut at-
tacks differed with respect to coverage bias, news sympathy,
and information propagation.
2. We provide a public annotated multi-language (English,
Arabic, French, German) dataset that can be used to train
learning algorithms to predict news sympathy on Twitter
during terror events (see Supplementary Material A8).
RELATED WORK
Media Bias in Communication and Social Media
Trumper et al. [49] examined biases in online news sources
and social media communities around them, and by analyzing
80 international news sources during a two-week period, they
showed that biases are subtle but observable, and follow geo-
graphical boundaries more closely than political ones. Sert et
al. [61] proposed to leverage user comments along with the
content of the online news articles to automatically identify
the latent aspects of a given news topic, to be used as a first
step in detecting the news resources that are biased towards
certain subsets of these latent aspects. Park et al. [46] took a
different approach towards media bias with NewsCube, where
they automatically provide readers with multiple classified
viewpoints on a news event of interest. Dallmann et al. [10]
investigated a dataset covering all political and economical
news from four leading online German newspapers over four
years, and showed that statistically significant differences in
the reporting about specific parties can be detected between
the analyzed online newspapers.
More generally, social media content biases have been ob-
served across datasets. In a study of Twitter, Flickr, and
Swarm, it was shown that volunteered geographic information
is “local" (geotags correspond closely with the home loca-
tions of its contributors) in only about 75% of cases [27], and
compounded by how localness is defined [28]. This effect in-
fluences the design of geolocation inference algorithms, which
have been shown to exhibit significantly worse performance
for underrepresented populations (i.e. rural users), even when
overcorrecting for populations biases [26].
Twitter for Crisis and Controversy Understanding
Twitter has shown to be a rich resource to study media bias and
controversy, especially after major events, whether political,
religious, or natural (e.g., [2, 6, 52]). Morgan et al. [43] found
that Twitter users share news in similar ways regardless of
outlet or perceived outlet ideology, and that as users share
more news content, they tend to quickly include outlets with
opposing views. Younes et al. [62] looked at how traditional
8https://github.com/abdoelali/CrisisNewsSympathy
media outlets and social media differ in coverage of an event,
and focused on coverage patterns of NYTimes articles and
tweets during the Egyptian uprising in 2011. To discover such
patterns, they proposed a simple media bias measurement
model for day-to-day news items built on top of topic models.
They found that traditional news sources have a wider disparity
in the ranks and hence a strong presence of media bias.
Wei et al. [59] proposed an empirical measure to quan-
tify mainstream media bias based on sentiment analysis and
showed that it correlates better with the actual political bias
in the UK media than pure quantitative measures based on
media coverage of various political parties. They then studied
media behavior on Twitter during the 2010 UK General Elec-
tion, and showed that while most information flow originated
from the media, they seem to lose their dominant position in
shaping public opinion during this general election. Olteanu
et al. [44] investigated several crises using public Twitter data
– including natural hazards and human-induced disasters – in a
systematic manner and found that tweets expressing sympa-
thy and emotional support constituted on average 20% of the
crisis-related datasets. The four crises in which the messages
in this category were most prevalent (>40%) all pertained to
instantaneous disasters (which included terror attacks).
News Sentiment and Polarity Analysis
Typically, assessing news articles for polarity involves classi-
fying text for three-valued sentiment: positive, neutral, and
negative (e.g., [16]). However, recently researchers have taken
more fine grained approaches towards modeling complex emo-
tions, such as Lin and Margolin’s [35] work on quantifying the
diffusion of fear, sympathy, and solidarity during the Boston
bombings, and Schulz et al.’s [50] work on multi-valued senti-
ment classification. Moreover, Vargas et al. [57] showed that
there are marked differences between the overall tweet senti-
ment and the sentiment expressed towards subjects mentioned
in the tweets. Mejova et al. [40] took a data-driven approach
to understand how controversy interplays with emotional ex-
pression and biased language in news using crowdsourcing,
and found negative affect and biased language prevalent in
controversial issues, while using strong emotions is tempered.
METHODOLOGY
Defining News Sympathy and Sentiment
To quantify sympathy, we needed firstly to define sympathy.
We use Decety & Chaminade’s [11] definition where “sym-
pathy is an affective response that...consists of feelings of
concern for the distressed or needy other person". While at-
tempts have been to capture sentiment through tokenization
[45], both sentiment and sympathy are hard to capture com-
putationally. However, sympathy [35] and sentiment [15] can
be detected from text. Therefore, we consider sympathy (is
the tweet sympathetic or not towards the affected individuals?)
and sentiment (is the tweet negative, neutral, or positive?) as
relevant variables to study in higher resolution whether Arab
and Western media covered the two attacks differently.
Approach Overview
To build a dataset of tweets from news media accounts for
later analysis to answer our research questions, we employ
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Figure 1: Overview of methodological pipeline.
the following methodology (pipeline shown in Fig. 1): (1)
Twitter Data Collection & Preprocessing (2) Crowdsourcing
Annotation (3) Analysis and Prediction. The first two steps are
described in detail below, the third in the following section.
Twitter Data Collection & Preprocessing
We have collected and used four different datasets (described
below): Beirut, Paris, Paris Ruest, and Paris Combined.
Beirut dataset: We collected 906,538 tweets on the Beirut
bombings on November 12, 2015 shortly after news break-
out (approx. 21:00 CET), using the Twitter Streaming API
and with these hashtags: #lebanon, #beirut, #beirut2paris,
#beirutattacks, #beirutbombing. The dataset was pruned for
duplicates. Collection spanned 3.31 days, from 2015-11-12
18:51:07 UTC till 2015-11-16 02:17:04 UTC. Our dataset con-
sisted of 667,073 (73.58%) retweets and 610,879 unique users.
After removing retweets, our dataset had 239,093 unique
tweets. The top five hashtags for this dataset are shown in
Table 1. What is immediately striking here are the high oc-
currences of the hashtags #paris and #parisattacks, where we
attribute this due to the overlap between people’s attention to
the Paris attacks after having heard about the Beirut attacks.
Beirut Paris (merged)
Count Hashtag Count Hashtag
95,280 #beirut 6,777,117 #parisattacks
66,898 #paris 5,765,292 #paris
56,021 #lebanon 1,672,152 #prayforparis
41,245 #parisattacks 778,132 #bataclan
21,546 #isis 760,320 #porteouverte
Table 1: Top five most frequent hashtags for each dataset.
Paris dataset: We collected a total of 5,339,452 tweets dur-
ing the two days (13th and 14th) after the November 2015
Paris attacks using the Twitter Streaming API and with the
following hashtags: #paris, #france, #parisattacks, #prayfor-
paris, and #porteouverte. Some of these JSON records (0.03%)
were poorly structured and others were duplicates, and thus
removed. This resulted in a total of 5,337,840 tweets. Collec-
tion spanned 1.17 days, from 2015-11-14 13:30:49 UTC till
2015-11-15 18:06:54 UTC. Our Paris dataset had a total of
4,045,046 (75.78%) retweets and 2,538,348 unique users.
Region Country (population per million)
Middle East (6) Egypt (89.6), Iraq (34.8), Saudi Arabia (30.9), United
Arab Emirates (9.1), Jordan (6.6), Lebanon (4.5)
Western (5) USA (318.9), Germany (80.9), France (66.2), United
Kingdom (64.5), Spain (46.4)
Table 2: Regions and countries of interest for our analysis. Population esti-
mates drawn from the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/; last retrieved:
24.12.2017)
Paris Ruest dataset: In addition to our collection, we use a
larger dataset created by Nick Ruest9, who collected tweets
shortly after the attacks occurred (approx. 23:00 UTC on
November 13) with the following hashtags: #paris, #parisat-
tacks, #prayforparis, and #porteouverte. We hydrated (col-
lected metadata for tweets based on tweet IDs) the dataset on
2015-11-19 using the Twitter public API, and collected a total
of 12,788,201 tweets. Tweet volume was less (attrition rate:
14.4%) than the original collection (N=14,939,154), which is
common given that some tweets are removed (either by Twitter
or by users). This collection spanned 33.96 days, from 2015-
11-04 21:14:39 UTC till 2015-12-08 20:54:03 UTC. NH’s
Paris dataset had a total of 9,742,241 (76.18%) retweets and
4,127,762 unique users.
Paris Combined dataset: For later analysis, we combined
both datasets. We expanded the Paris dataset (by merging with
the Paris Ruest dataset) because it spanned only 1.17 days
after the Paris attacks, while the Beirut dataset spanned 3.31
days. This step is important for temporally aligning the Paris
dataset with the Beirut dataset. Additionally, the imbalanced
dataset size notwithstanding, we later downsample all datasets
to ensure the datasets are balanced and any effects seen are not
an artifact of a large sample size. Merging datasets resulted in
a total of 16,868,318 tweets. Our dataset consisted of 75.6%
retweets, resulting in a total of 4,110,291 unique tweets with
4,013,489 unique users. This combined Paris dataset (with
retweets and duplicates removed) is used for all subsequent
analyses, and will be referred to simply as the Paris dataset.
Crawling & Extracting News Media Tweets
To answer our questions about media coverage bias (specifi-
cally differences in news sympathy), we apply multiple pro-
cessing steps. We first crawl Twitter news (and blog) accounts,
extract the news tweets from our datasets, identify the lan-
guage of the tweets, slice our data by time to ensure that
the two event timelines match in duration, and finally draw
samples to ensure our data is sizeable and ready for human
computation. Details of each step is described below.
Crawling Twitter news accounts
Our first step was to identify and collect influential Western
and Arab news accounts on Twitter. The list of countries cho-
sen across the Middle East and the Western world are shown in
Table 2. With respect to the Middle East, we chose countries
that were geographically near Lebanon, and that did not have
explicit and/or visible political nor religious conflicts with
Lebanon at the time of collection (e.g., Syria was excluded
9http://ruebot.net/post/look-14939154-paris-bataclan-parisattacks-
porteouverte-tweets; last retrieved: 24.12.2017
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due to the ongoing conflict at the time of data collection). For
Western countries, we based our decision on population size,
language (English being most prominent), and proximity to
France. Despite that Twitter is dominated by English language
users10, we wanted to ensure that we were collecting news
media tweets from both English as well as the native language
of the countries of interest. To find news media11 accounts on
Twitter from these countries, we followed a two-step approach:
We found a seed set of accounts automatically (using Twit-
ter’s relevance-based Search API) by crawling user accounts
(see Supplementary Material B) with news related queries
(e.g., ‘France news’ for English queries; ‘Nouvelles France’
for native language queries). This first step deliberately takes
a crude computational approach as curating news organiza-
tions by experts may be subject to bias, and could exclude
unfamiliar news accounts that possibly became highly active
during the time of crisis (e.g., bloggers new to the scene). We
included bloggers because (a) Bloggers play an important role
in disseminating news, cf., during the Arab spring in Tunisia
and Egypt [36]) (b) They are typically uncensored, since they
do not ‘officially’ provide public service [54].
To ensure a measure of influence, we only retrieve user ac-
counts with at least 5k followers. Despite earlier research that
showed a high number of followers does not always mean an
influential user [8], we used follower count as a simple heuris-
tic to gather prominent news accounts. While our collection
could also have include state-sponsored news (which is diffi-
cult to identify), our intention was to capture tweet samples
that users would likely see. We also checked for romanized
Arabic queries (e.g., Akhbar Masr), but did not find additional
accounts matching the >5k follower requirement. Our queries
returned six results (which we kept) with a follower count
<5k (Max=4,935, Min=4,473), with the rest >5k (Max=31.4M,
“CNN Breaking News"). We did not set a limit on account
creation date nor on Twitter verification, as our experiments
showed: (a) new bloggers and news agencies with accounts
created only a year earlier (2014) appeared to be quite active
in reporting events (b) even major news accounts were some-
times not Twitter verified, wherein we could potentially miss
important news accounts if we enabled this filter.
Returned accounts were manually inspected to ensure they
comprise news media outlets and blogger accounts. As a
sanity check, we also cross-checked whether account names
occur in public lists (e.g., Wikipedia pages ‘News media in
{Country}’12) and for blogger accounts, whether they cross-
link to a webpage. It is important to mention here that there is
no such benchmark list of news media accounts on Twitter. We
had a total of unique 208 news media accounts, where 93.3%
(194/208) of our dataset consists of news outlet accounts, and
the remainder 8 journalist and 6 blog accounts. Furthermore,
there was some overlap in accounts forWestern media (38/117)
10http://www.beevolve.com/twitter-statistics/#a3; last retrieved:
24.12.2017
11We use Wikipedia’s definition of news media, which includes blog
accounts: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_media ; last retrieved:
24.12.2017
12E.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_media_in_the_United_States;
last retrieved: 24.12.2017
coverage and for Arab media (38/91) coverage of Paris and
Beirut. The final list of unique crawled news organizations
(N=208) is provided as a supplementary dataset to this paper
(see Supplementary Material C)13.
Tweet Filtering by Accounts
After gathering a set of news accounts across countries using
both English and native language queries, we then matched
these user IDs with all IDs in our Beirut and Paris datasets.
The full set of queries used, the total number of Twitter news
accounts found, and the amount and percentage extracted from
both datasets are shown in Supplementary Material B. This
process resulted in four datasets: (1) Arab media covering
the Beirut attacks (N=2,766) (2) Arab media covering the
Paris attacks (N=2,728) (3) Western media covering the Beirut
attacks (N=245) (4) Western media covering the Paris attacks
(N=9,245). The datasets combined resulted in 14,984 tweets.
Term Filtering
As an additional step, we made sure that within each dataset,
there was no mention of the other set of attacks (e.g., we
removed all mentions of Paris from the Beirut dataset), and
that all tweets pertained to the events in question. Even though
the two attacks happened a day apart, where we would expect
cross-pollination across messages, we deliberately chose not to
include tweets that reference both the Paris and Beirut attacks,
as this may influence our attempts at investigating media bias
within each tweet dataset separately. For the Beirut dataset,
we filtered out tweets that included these terms: paris, parís
france, parisattacks, bataclan, parisattacks, porteouverte. For
the Paris dataset, we filtered out the following terms: beirut,
lebanon, beirutattacks,  ‡ A↵ JJ. À↵ [Lebanon], ⇣H Q ⌦↵K. [Beirut].
Near-duplicates Removal
Finally, to ensure that our dataset contains only unique tweets
without any near duplicates (as this would cause redundancy
later in the annotation task), we removed all partial duplicates
from our resulting datasets. This was done by applying the
Levenshtein distance [34] string similarity metric on the tweet
texts of each dataset, with a threshold set to 0.1. This reduced
the size of our dataset to 12,814 tweets.
Language Identification
To prepare our Beirut and Paris datasets for analysis of sympa-
thy, we need to be able to identify the language of the tweets
so crowdworkers can annotate them. To do so, we used the
langid.py [37] language identification Python package, and
computed the (percentage) distribution of languages. We used
langid.py as it provided us with classification probabilities
while Twitter’s ‘lang’ value does not provide such a metric, so
we could manually adjust the ‘lang’ of low confidence tweets.
To deal with any misclassifications from langid.py, we disqual-
ified any tweets with a normalized classification probability
of < 0.95, reducing our dataset to 10,460 unique tweets. For
the remainder of the tweets, we manually inspected and re-
classified all tweets with a normalized probability of > 0.95.
13We show the name, user name, user description, the country / query
used to retrieve the account, and follower count at the time of crawling
– all of which are publicly available data. Additionally, we include
tweet count and mean scores and standard deviations across all labels.
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We found that across all datasets combined, the languages of
tweets were either English (67%), German (13.9%), Arabic
(10.1%), French (8.3%), or Spanish (0.7%). Given the low
percentage of Spanish in our dataset, we decided to exclude
any Spanish tweets from all subsequent analyses.
Temporal event slicing and sampling
Given that our Beirut and Paris datasets differed temporally
in coverage of the attacks, we need to normalize coverage
duration as tweets posted 5 days after the attacks may differ
for example than tweets posted two weeks after the attacks.
Since we were constrained by the size and coverage duration
of our Beirut dataset, we used the coverage length of that
dataset as a seed to slice the Paris dataset. For our processed
Beirut dataset, our earliest coverage started on 2015-11-12
18:52:30 UTC (approx. 4 hours after the Beirut attacks that
took place around 18:00 EET) and went until 2015-11-16
02:00:10 UTC. This amounts to exactly 3.3 days. Thereafter,
we applied the same time slice for the processed Paris dataset,
where earliest coverage started from 2015-11-13 21:15:20
UTC (approximately one hour after the Paris attacks, which
started at 20:20 UTC) until 2015-11-17 02:30:23 UTC, giving
exactly 3.22 days. This time slicing further reduced the total
size of our combined datasets to 7,768 unique tweets: Western
media coverage of Beirut (N=131), Western media coverage
of Paris (N=5,298), Arab media coverage of Beirut (N=287),
and Arab media coverage of Paris (N=1,566).
Finally, to send our tweets for annotation by crowdworkers,
we only needed a sufficient sample from each of our four re-
sulting datasets to avoid lengthy crowdwork time and costs.
Even though this annotated data is limited, we later train and
classify our unlabeled data automatically which handles the
limitations of crowdsourcing. Therefore, we drew a random
sample of 1,000 tweets from the Paris datasets. However, ran-
dom sampling may miss important tweets that occurred on
specific days within our 3.3 days. Therefore, we split each
dataset into separate buckets of approximately 24 hours, and
drew normalized random samples from each bucket to elimi-
nate bias in drawing more samples from a day that happens to
have more records. The normalization constant was calculated
by dividing the size of the desired sample draw (1,000) by the
total number of rows in each dataset. For each bucket, the
sample drawn was the number of records in that bucket mul-
tiplied by the normalization constant, and rounded to ensure
all day buckets cap at 1,000 records. This process reduced
the size of the Paris attacks datasets (Western and Arab media
coverage) each to N=1,000. The final language distribution of
our language-specific datasets ready for annotation is shown
in Fig. 2.
Crowdsourced Overall Sympathy Annotation
To annotate our datasets, we employed crowdworkers through
the CrowdFlower14 platform. We had four language-specific
datasets with corresponding annotation instructions. A
language-specific dataset covered both the Beirut and Paris
attacks, which meant there was an assumption that a worker
had to be familiar with both events to accurately label tweets.
For each language-specific annotation task, we provided task
14http://crowdflower.com/; last retrieved: 24.12.2017
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Figure 2: Language distribution of tweets to be annotated across datasets.
instructions and examples in that target language (translated
from English by native speakers). For each tweet (and any
accompanying media), a worker had to label it for sympathy
(sympathetic15, unsympathetic) and sentiment (positive, neu-
tral, negative), and optionally ‘NA’ for non-applicable tweets.
For worker selection, we ensured workers spoke the target
language. We did not set a restriction on worker location, as a
worker could speak a target language (e.g., Arabic) yet reside
in a non-Arabic speaking country. While we set target lan-
guage requirements, we did not make our tweets into images
(cf., [5]), which can be a limitation. Following standard guide-
lines from CrowdFlower, 10-15 tweets per language-specific
task were classified by the paper authors. We did not trust
assessments of any worker who differed significantly from
our own (cut-off point of < 70% agreement). Workers were
presented with the original tweet, and included media items
(image or video), and were asked to label it. While we are
aware of the potential ethical concerns on behalf of Twitter
users in displaying their name (cf., [44]), in our case we were
only displaying tweets from news organizations, who are pre-
sumably aware and even encourage publicizing their content.
Importantly, omitting the username of our tweets would risk
misrepresenting the original tweet and its overall sympathy.
Trusted workers took on average (across all languages) 57
seconds (interquartile mean) to label each tweet. We collected
labels from at least 3 different trusted workers per tweet and
task16, where the final label of the tweet was determined by
majority vote. We followed the guidelines of CrowdFlower,
and set a limit of no worker labeling more than 300 items in
our rating task. Workers were paid 10 cents per page, where
each page contained 5 tweets. This amounted to approximately
$10 per 100 tweets. In the end, we had a total of 2,390 x 2 x 3
= 14,340 labels (excluding the ‘not applicable’ checkbox).
Annotation Quality
Despite that labeling sentiment can be subjective (cf., [45]),
we provided detailed instructions and examples of Positive,
Negative, and Neutral tweets (see Supplementary Material
D) to ensure workers correctly label the data. Moreover, our
inter-rater agreement scores drawn from CrowdFlower (Table
3) are promising, with the lowest being 69.1% for sentiment
classification of Arabic tweets, which is in line with previous
work, and highlights the reliability of crowdsourced social
15E.g., thoughts, prayers, sadness, solidarity with affected individuals.
16Note that if a tweet has different labels from all 3 workers, the
CrowdFlower platform brings in additional workers.
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Lang. # Tweets Label a=3 (%) Fleiss’ Kappa
EN 1732 Sentiment 69.3 0.27
Sympathy 83.4 0.42
AR 354 Sentiment 69.1 0.32
Sympathy 82.7 0.29
FR 147 Sentiment 73.1 0.22
Sympathy 82.4 0.32
DE 185 Sentiment 73.1 0.28
Sympathy 85.5 0.38
Table 3: Trusted worker agreement (a=3) scores across languages (from
CrowdFlower) and our own computed Fleiss’ Kappa scores.
media annotation [44, 13]. As a further measure, we also
computed Fleiss’ Kappa for the labeled tweets, and found rea-
sonable agreement scores (Table 3), with sentiment expectedly
exhibiting lowest agreement across languages17. Furthermore,
we followed Olteanu et al.’s [44] approach and independently
(N=2) rated a random sample of 15 tweets from each lan-
guage dataset18 (total N=60) and computed unweighted Co-
hen’s Kappa for each factor except sentiment (which was
weighted). Our ratings reached substantial agreement on sen-
timent (k=0.70, CI: [0.52,0.88]) and sympathy (k=0.71, CI:
[0.50,0.91]) labels. Thereafter, we took our agreement ratings
and compared their joint label with those provided by workers,
and we reached reasonable agreement for sentiment (k=0.64,
CI: [0.42,0.87]) and sympathy (k=0.59, CI: [0.37,0.82]).
Access to our anonymized data set is available (see Supple-
mentary Material A) and on GitHub: https://github.com/
abdoelali/CrisisNewsSympathy.
RESULTS
Coverage Bias
We looked at normalized tweet volume fromWestern and Arab
media across both attacks (N=7,768), and visualize this daily
and hourly in Fig. 3. Attention bursts reflect day-night cycles.
From the graphs, we can see that for the Beirut attacks, there
was more coverage from Arab media, with the inverse for
the Paris attacks, which shows more Western media coverage.
We ran a Chi-square test with Yates’ continuity correction
across all days to compare the difference between Arab and
Western media coverage. In line with our hypothesis, our test
revealed a statistically significant difference in tweet activity
volume between how much Western (M=0.909) and Arab
media (M=5.37) covered the Beirut attacks and by how much
Western (M=36.79) and Arab media (M=10.87) covered the
Paris attacks (c2(1, N=7,768) = 1489, p<0.001, f=0.44, odds
ratio=0.05). From this, we accept the alternative hypothesis
that there was indeed coverage bias across both attacks.
Furthermore, did Western and Arab media follow a similar
pattern of tweeting? We ran correlation analyses between
hourly tweet volume for both attacks across media coverage,
and found that for the Beirut attacks, Western and Arab me-
dia exhibited a medium-sized correlation (Spearman (r) =
0.608, p<0.001; fc=0.698) and for the Paris attacks exhibited
a significant and strong correlation (Spearman (r) = 0.943,
17Since sentiment is 3-valued instead of binary, it could more likely
result in higher rating variance.
18We ensured that the tweets were translated by native speakers.
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Figure 3: Hour by hour normalized tweet activity volume across the days after
the Beirut attacks (left) and Paris attacks (right). Best seen in color.
p<0.001; fc=0.918). We see that for tweet activity volume,
Western and Arab media are engaged at approximately similar
time points, which supports the fairness of our collected data
on Western and Arab media across these two attacks.
News Media Sympathy Bias
Understanding Sympathy and Sentiment
The percentage level distributions for sympathy and sentiment
are shown in Fig. 4. As previous work showed sentiment alone
may not be enough to capture subtleties, especially in crisis
data [44, 50, 57], we needed to build on this prior work and
explore whether sentiment may be a useful construct in our
analysis. To understand the relationship between sentiment
and sympathy, we developed a binomial logistic regression
model, since the categorical variable sympathy to predict is
binary. We report our results in Table 4. We did this to delve
deeper into the relationship between these two variables. No
multicollinearity effects were found. Our regression model
(Eq. 1) is as follows:
logit(pSymp) = log
✓
pSymp
1  pSymp
◆
= b0+b1Si (1)
where: pSymp is the probability that a tweet is sympathetic,
given the predictor sentiment (Si). pSymp ranges between 0
and 1, so pSymp 2 {0, . . . ,1}. b0 is the intercept from the
linear regression equation (the value of the criterion when the
predictor is equal to zero). b1Si is the regression coefficient
multiplied by our sentiment predictor.
We first present the goodness of fit of our model and how it
fares against the (intercept) null model (Table 4). Compared to
the null model, our model provides considerable explanatory
power with significant reduction in deviance. However, while
the difference may be statistically significant, the difference
between model deviances do not differ much, as is evident
by the goodness of fit McFadden R2, which is 0.2. Testing
our sentiment19 model against the null model yields signif-
icant results (c2(1, N=2,390) = 2425.7, p<0.001). To test
out the performance of our model, we used 80% of our data
for training purposes and parameter tuning and the remaining
20% were held out for testing. For training, we used k-fold
(k=10) cross-validation given the small dataset size (N=2,390).
Next we report our results on the 20% held-out test dataset.
19Sentiment is split between neutral and positive in our models due to
dummy variable coding for non-binary categorical variables.
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Figure 4: Factor level distributions for Arab media coverage of Paris attacks
(AFR), Western media coverage of Paris attacks (WFR), Arab media coverage
of Beirut attacks (ALB), Western media coverage of Beirut attacks (WLB).
Accuracy of our model is 79% (Precision = 0.79, Recall =
0.41, F-1 = 0.54), which highlights that sentiment appears to
have sufficient power for predicting sympathy. Nevertheless,
while sentiment is important, from our data it is also clear that
is different from sympathy.
To better understand the relationship between sympathy and
sentiment, we further tested correlations20 between them.
There was a strong positive correlation between sentiment
and sympathy (Spearman (r) = 0.19, p<.001; Cramer’s V (fc)
= 0.49), indicating we are likely measuring closely related con-
cepts. These results support our regression model coefficients.
Given the results of of both our regression modeling and corre-
lation analyses, we find that sympathy as a concept is related to
sentiment. Since our crowd sourcing results analysis revealed
that they are more or less capture similar signals, we chose to
focus on sympathy. Below, we present our approach to predict
sympathy from the tweet text, where we investigate sympathy
classification performance on unseen (i.e., unlabeled) data.
Classifying News Media Sympathy
The crowdsourced annotation task was not able to cover the
entire corpus due to practical constraints (e.g., the cost and
availability of workers). To generalize the analysis to unla-
beled data, we also developed machine learning models that
recognize the sympathy of tweets. The learning task was de-
signed as a binary classification problem where a model aims
to classify if a given tweet is sympathetic or unsympathetic.
A classification model was built for each language, and each
model was trained using the data annotated through crowd-
sourcing and applied to the rest. For the classification model,
we adopted a convolutional neural network (CNN) combined
with word2vec embeddings (cf., [29]). This work extended the
recent successful applications of deep learning models in NLP
tasks to sentence classification and showed the model achieves
high performance even with a very simple architecture (i.e.,
one convolutional layer) and little tuning, which keeps pa-
rameter count low and reduces needed training samples. This
CNN architecture has a single channel (word2vec embeddings)
and three layers: the embedding layer which translates words
20We use Spearman’s rho in addition to Cramer’s V (since our data is
not normally distributed) by making an assumption that our dichoto-
mous variables exhibit a monotonic relationship, and therefore can be
treated as ordinal variables. Moreover, Cramer’s V is symmetric, and
does not show negative relationships (i.e., no correlation direction).
Characterizing Sympathy
Model
Variable Coefficient (Standard error)
SentimentNEUT -1.0*** (0.07)
SentimentPOS 2.38*** (0.15)
Intercept -0.79*** (0.07)
McFadden’s R2 0.2
Deviance 2453.6
AIC 2453.6
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Table 4: Logistic regression model examining sentiment factor associated
with tweet sympathy.
of a sentence to corresponding word2vec embeddings; con-
volutional layer that applies filters over sliding windows of
words and extracts a feature through max-pooling; final layer
performs dropout regularization [55] and classifies the result
using softmax (see [29] for more details of the model).
Since we pre-trained embeddings on our entire corpus, it
makes binary classification easier to fit on smaller data. Also,
complexity of conventional models (logit regression, SVM)
is not low for NLP tasks: n-grams easily make the feature
space very large. They often require language specific pre-
processing and feature selection techniques, which increases
complexity since we deal with multiple languages. Instead,
such problems (e.g., capturing local context [21]) are dealt
with by the CNN model itself, increasing clarity and method
replicability. The word2vec embeddings were pre-trained for
each language [41]. Given a text corpus, word2vec learns a
lower-dimensional vector (100 dimensions in our experiment)
representation of words that preserves the semantic distance
between them. As we deal with tweets for a particular topic,
we used the entire set of collected tweets for training the em-
beddings instead of using an available general corpus. Since
we pre-train on our entire corpus, it makes binary classification
easier to fit on smaller data. Also, complexity of conventional
models (e.g., SVMs) is not low for NLP tasks: n-grams easily
make the feature space very large. Especially since we deal
with multiple languages. Instead, such problems (e.g., captur-
ing local context [21]) are dealt with by the CNN model itself,
increasing clarity and method replicability.
We briefly describe the configuration of the model (the details
can be found in the TensorFlow implementation we used [7]).
The model is trained through stochastic gradient descent with
the Adadelta update rule [63]. It trains for 100 epochs using
shuffled mini-batches of 64 instances. Three different filter
sizes (3, 4, and 5 words) were used for convolution, and 128
filters were made for each size. Dropout rate was set to .5. For
evaluation of the approach, we ran 10-fold cross validation
(Table 5). We chose balanced accuracy21 to account for class
imbalances in our data, and report the precision and recall
for each class. Overall, the weighted average of the balanced
accuracies across languages was 72.5% (shown in Table 5).
News Media Sympathy Analysis
Since our sympathy labels are not normally distributed, we ran
Mann-Whitney U tests to compare the difference in sympathy
21Arithmetic mean of class-specific accuracies.
CHI 2018 Paper CHI 2018, April 21–26, 2018, Montréal, QC, Canada
Paper 556 Page 8
Overall balanced accuracy: 0.725
EN balanced accuracy: 0.762
Sympathetic Unsympathetic
Precision 0.643 0.8882
Recall 0.568 0.911
AR balanced accuracy: 0.699
Sympathetic Unsympathetic
Precision 0.65 0.748
Recall 0.381 0.846
FR balanced accuracy: 0.812
Sympathetic Unsympathetic
Precision 0.783 0.841
Recall 0.32 0.964
DE balanced accuracy: 0.501
Sympathetic Unsympathetic
Precision 0.867 0.135
Recall 0.811 0.208
Table 5: Balanced accuracies (Sympathetic, Unsympathetic) for unlabeled
news media tweets (N=5,378) across each language.
between Arab and Western media for each of the datasets on
the Paris and Beirut attacks. We found a statistically signifi-
cant difference in sympathy scores between Western and Arab
media in coverage of the Beirut attacks (Z=5.146, p<0.001,
r=0.22), as well as between Western and Arab media in cover-
age of the Paris attacks (Z=4.151 p<0.01, r=0.09). To ensure
that the effects we observe are not due to imbalances in the
size of the compared datasets, we down-sampled all datasets
to the minimum dataset size, namely Western media reporting
of Beirut (N=112). We used random downsampling with-
out replacement to align each pair of datasets, and to ensure
any downsampling biases are removed, we tested differences
(Mann-Whitney U tests) in sympathy scores across 1000 sam-
pling runs (seeds)22 To combine probabilities, we used Fisher’s
method23 [17, 31] shown in Eq. 2 below:
 2
k
Â
i=1
log(pi)⇠ x22k (2)
where pi is the p-value for the ith hypothesis test and k is
number of sampling runs. When the p-values tend to be small,
the test statistic X2 will be large, which suggests that the null
hypotheses are not true for every test. Here again, we found a
statistically significant differences in sympathy scores between
Western and Arab media coverage of the Beirut attacks (c2(1,
N=2,000) = 22467.62, p<0.001) as well as coverage of the
Paris attacks (c2(1, N=2,000) = 19458.9, p<0.001).
Table 6 presents CNN-based classification results of the un-
labeled data, showing the ratio of sympathetic tweets. For
Western media coverage of the Beirut attacks, we had very few
unlabeled tweets (N=1). Thus we instead report the ratio from
the labeled (ground truth) data. The findings described above
were consistently observed in the results. Western media had
less sympathetic tweets than Arab media in coverage of the
Beirut attacks, and the difference in the amount of sympathetic
tweets is larger than that for the Paris attacks. Another way
22Since p-value combination under Fisher’s method follows a X2-
square distribution, we needed a minimum of 220 runs to achieve
0,95 power and 0.3 effect size under a=0.05.
23This is a common method used for aggregating probabilities, how-
ever we tested other methods (e.g., voting) and results did not differ.
Paris Beirut
Arab 0.609 (N=708) 0.976 (N=338)
Western 0.215 (N=4270) 0.152† (N=112)
†Value drawn from labeled (ground truth) data.
Table 6: Ratio of sympathetic tweets.
to view this is that each media coverage (Arab, Western) was
overall more sympathetic towards the country affected in their
respective region. Western media was more sympathetic to-
wards Paris, while Arab media was more sympathetic towards
Beirut. This aligns with prior work showing strong region-
alism in news geography [33] and with producer-consumer
attention asymmetries across countries [1].
Sympathy and Sentiment in Tweet Propagation
Finally, we tested whether news sympathy has network effects,
specifically whether sympathetic tweets result in higher infor-
mation propagation. Given prior work on what makes online
content go viral (cf., emotionality and positivity in Berger
et al.’s work [4]), we expected sympathy and positive senti-
ment to be good indicators. Therefore, we tested sympathy
as well as sentiment. Combining all (crowdsourced labeled)
data together, we tested whether sympathy labels were cor-
related with retweet count. We found a weak yet significant
negative correlation (Spearman (r) =-0.06, p<0.05). Given
the low correlation, we cannot state that such sympathetic
tweets would result in higher information propagation. We
further tested whether sentiment correlates with tweet spread,
however we did not find a significant effect (Spearman (r)
=0.011, p=5.78). While these findings may be in contrast to
what Hanson et al. [24] and to what Berger et al. [4] found,
where neither sympathy nor sentiment increased virality, this
could be due to hidden factors such as the timeliness and
informativeness of the crisis news tweets in our dataset.
What is interesting to observe here is that while retweeting
behavior appears to be impartial as to whether a tweet is sym-
pathetic or not, it does appear (within our dataset) that this
similarly applies to sentiment labels, which is in contrast to
Berger et al.’s findings that emotionality enhances virality.
This is likely attributed to changing user information needs in
the days following an attack (e.g., retweeting cries for help).
DISCUSSION
Foreign News Coverage Differences
Examining differences in foreign news coverage is important
as the media has the power to shape the public perception about
foreign countries [58]. Not just selection, but how a piece of
news is reported has the capacity to evoke compassion, which
could lead to various charitable acts, such as fund-raising to
provide monetary support [32]. When an unexpected crisis
such as a terror attack on Beirut or Paris strikes, with quality
coverage, it has the power to instigate collective worldwide
public action. The unique context of our study, marked by
the rare successive occurrences of two crisis events at places
within the Western and Arab world, allows exploring the rel-
ative differences specific to those two worlds. We believe
looking into this closely is especially important in this era as
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tensions between those two worlds intensify in various regions
and the need to deepen mutual understanding increases.
As mentioned earlier, the issue of differential coverage was
picked up by media and speculations were made that the Beirut
attacks received less attention than Paris. Our analysis sup-
ports the speculation that at least on Twitter, indeed there were
less coverage of Beirut (RQ1). It may be obvious that the
Paris attacks were more newsworthy than the Beirut attacks;
this is what news flow theory would predict [51, 60], since
Paris fulfills the criteria of a familiar, powerful foreign coun-
try, close geographically to other European states, and had an
unexpected, human-induced crisis occur. This is also what the
newsworthiness theory by Galtung and Holmboe [18] would
predict, as newsworthiness depends on factors such as fre-
quency, intensity, unambiguity, and unexpectedness. Although
such theories offer explanations about coverage bias, one can
draw different opinions about the news value considering the
contemporary context of the two worlds (e.g., perhaps Arab
states have heightened empathy towards other Arab states),
and we believe our study provides one possible way of framing
the discussion; how the media of two worlds allocated atten-
tion to the event abroad in relation to the domestic event. This
framing can be further extended to coverage of other events
and other countries, opening a space for future work.
While our main finding was that the media of both worlds
produced less amount of sympathetic coverage for a crisis
abroad (RQ2), an additional observation was that Arab media
coverage was more sympathetic, even though we expected
that Western media would be more sympathetic when cover-
ing Paris. We interpret this result interesting as it could be
capturing cultural differences in journalism practice [12, 23].
We believe it is important to understand and consider cultural
differences as it can enable more sophisticated analyses of bi-
ases in the media of different cultural regions. This result also
suggests the possibility of approaching cultural differences in
journalism practice using advanced computational methods.
As we applied a deep learning technique to detect sympathetic
tweets, we provide an initial step towards further large-scale
quantitative analysis techniques that can shed light on captur-
ing such cultural differences. As an example, while we did not
observe differences in how sympathetic news tweets spread
by Twitter users (RQ3), we found that the best predictor of
retweeting activity is the number of followers (Spearman (r) =
0.76, p<0.001). While this fits our intuitions and understand-
ing of how Twitter works [8], it invites further thought on how
network effects manifest across content and global events.
Relatedly, as platforms such as Twitter are widely used for
journalism at a global scale, our work also invites the devel-
opment of tools or design features to support reflections on
the newsworthiness of international events. For example, a
dynamic dashboard to track foreign news topics covered in
the media of different countries. From an end-user perspec-
tive, our work furthermore contributes a first step towards an
approach that can be implemented as a Twitter feature that
automatically detects not just sentiment, but also sympathy.
By accounting for time-criticality in news reporting during
crisis situations, this can can aid journalistic practice in situ,
by automatically detecting sympathy in Twitter text as news re-
porters rush to formulate event-specific content. Finally, while
we did not test this, it is relevant to investigate whether/how
English and non-English language media differ in reporting.
Limitations
We have analyzed a snapshot of Twitter data after the Beirut
and Paris attacks, where we made several decisions in how
we treated the data. Also, it was not viable to test whether
news sympathy differed across all countries in the Western
world, and compare with news coverage of all Arab countries.
Instead, we focused on geographic regions that made sense to
test in the context of these attacks, and in this regard, our work
provides an approximation of the differences in news coverage
across Western and Arab media. Furthermore, our hashtags
for the Beirut dataset were written in Latin alphabet. However,
we were able to collect a sufficient number of tweets to run
our analyses, where 62.1% of Arab media tweets in our final
Beirut dataset consisted of Arabic tweets.
A potential limiting factor is the ‘hostile media effect’ [47],
a perceptual theory of mass communication that refers to the
tendency for individuals with strong preexisting attitudes on an
issue to perceive neutral media coverage as biased against their
perspective, and instead adopt the antagonists’ point of view.
This phenomenon could have surfaced in crowdworkers, where
workers from one country could have held biases when rating
tweets. This may be amplified since we did not conceal names
of news accounts (which we did to ensure tweets were close
to real-world conditions). However, since each tweet received
at least three trusted judgments, we have confidence that our
annotations are likely to be untainted by such a bias. One way
to address this is to survey crowdworkers for demographics
and political orientation (cf., [39]). Finally, we looked only
at Twitter, which is shown to contain network biases [22].
Nevertheless, the large quantity of tweets and prevalence of
reactions on this divided issue of Arab versus Western news
coverage provided an initial step to test our approach.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a data-driven approach to tease out differences
between Western and Arab Twitter news reporting of the 2015
Paris and Beirut attacks, where we found evidence for differen-
tial coverage across the attacks. For sympathy bias, we found
that Western media tweets were less sympathetic when cover-
ing the Beirut attacks, however Western media was overall less
sympathetic than Arab media, even for Paris. Finally, based on
our labeled data, we trained a deep CNN to predict sympathy
from unlabeled data, and results further supported our ground
truth analysis that Western media had less sympathetic tweets
than the Arab media, across both attacks. As a more general
framework, our work contributes to an understanding of media
bias on Twitter, and factors that may influence it, which are
not necessarily limited to the studied attacks. We believe the
methods we adopted are more widely applicable to other areas
of computational journalism, and can serve as useful tools to
better understand, expose, and design around media bias.
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